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1. Introducti on
What is the likely impact of the current economic crisis on human
development? Given that the impact is at present di±cult to track in
real time, we refer to the literature to explore how human development
indicators (income, health and malnutrition, educational enrollment
and attainment) have been a®ected in past economic shocks. Since
the human development impacts of economic crises are highly policy-
relevant, and directly linked to the welfare of many generations, the
literature on this issue is abundant, although the selection of data
and approaches vary across empirical studies.
The relationship between human development indicators such as
poverty rates, health, and education indicators and both the long-
term trends and short-term °uctuations in economic growth have
been analyzed in the literature. There is ample evidence that long-run
GDP per capita growth has a strong positive correlation with human
development indicators. However, the direction of causality is still
debated: economic growth is often regarded as the foundation for im-
proved human development. Furthermore, a certain level of human
development may be required for higher growth in the future (see
Lustig, Arias and Rigolini, 2002, for a review).
Here we focus instead on the e®ects of medium- or short-term
growth °uctuations on human development outcomes (considering
the changes in these indicators compared to their long-term trend).
The literature on the human development impacts of economic °uc-
tuations suggest some stylized facts. First, there exists an asymmetry
between rich and poor countries in terms ofthe magnitude ofimpacts
of economic crises: Health and education outcomes in rich countries
are often improved during economic crises, while they deteriorate in
poor countries. Second, economic expansions have less signi¯cant
e®ects than economic contractions: the recovery in human develop-
ment indicators is not as rapid and steep (if it occurs at all) as the
deterioration that occurrs during an economic downturn.
2. Econom i c C ri ses and Poverty
Economic crises often increase transitory income poverty (and may
also have a permanent e®ect on poverty ifthe crises deplete the assets
and hurt the human capital of a®ected people, especially the poor).
World Bank (2008a) estimates that a one percent decline in develop-
ing country growth rates traps an additional 20 million people intoOVERVI EW :ECONOMI C CRI S ESAND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 39
poverty. However, this is an average e®ect: the poverty elasticity of
income varies across countries and time periods, depending, amongst
other factors, on the distribution of income, social policies, and the
sector/geographic incidence of changes in income. Therefore, it is
useful to consider cases of past e®ects of economic crises on poverty
rates.
In the cases reviewed by Lustig (2000) and Skou¯as (2003) sum-
marized in table 1, the poverty rate increased during economic crises,
in several cases quite sharply in a short period of time. For instance,
in Argentina, the poverty headcount rate increased about 10 percent-
age points in each of the three crises listed in the table, in the most
two recent crises this increase took place within a period of just two
years. During the Asian ¯nancial crisis of1997-1998, the poverty rate
almost tripled in two years in the Rep. of Korea and increased by
almost ten percentage points, also within two years, in Indonesia.
Tabl e 1
Econom i c Cri ses and Poverty H eadcount
R atios in S elected C ou n tries
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Tabl e 1
(continued)










Sources: Lusti g (2000: 4) and Skou¯as (2003: 1088).
Lustig and Walton (1999) identify three main channels through
which negative aggregate economic shocks transmit in the short-run
to families and individuals, potentially aggravating poverty, reducing
consumption and depleting savings. The ¯rst channel corresponds to
reduced labor demand, which can result both in a drop in real wages
and/or loss of employment. The second relates to changes in prices.
In°ation erodes purchasing power with potentially dramatic conse-
quences at the lower end of the income distribution scale, as does,
more generally, price volatility. However, changes in prices a®ect
households di®erently. For example, the impact of changes in food
prices depends on whether households are net food consumers or pro-
d u c e r s ,a sw e l la so nt h ed i r e c t i o no ft h ec h a n g ei np r i c e s .T h et h i r d
channel relates to reductions in public spending, which contributes to
further reductions in labor demand as well as to a reduction in the
provision of public services.
T h e r ei sv e r ys t r o n ge v i d e n c et h a tt h e s et h r e ec h a n n e l s ,i n d i -
vidually or in combination, are pervasive during aggregate economic
shocks. For example, in Costa Rica's 1981-1983 economic crisis, with
GDPcontracting by 14 percent between 1981 and 1982, real wages fell
by approximately 50 percent between 1981 and 1983 (Funkhouser,
1999). During the Mexican 1995-1996 crisis, the negative economic
shock was accompanied by a very signi¯cant fall in real wages. Real
hourly peso wages fell by 12.6 percent in 1995 and by a further 9.9
percent in 1996, before showing their ¯rst increase in 1998 (McKenzie,
2003). Unemployment rose sharply and there was a shift of the laborOVERVI EW :ECONOMI C CRI S ESAND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 41
force into the \informal" sector (Martin, 2000). Savings declined sig-
ni¯cantly in Mexico from 1994 to 1996 (Attanasio and Sz¶ ekely, 1998).
Wages and household consumption were severely a®ected by Pe-
ru's economic crisis in 1988-1990. GDPper capita fell by 10.5 percent,
13.4 percent and 6.9 percent each year from 1988 to 1990. In°ation
reached almost 7,500 percent in 1990. The fall in output and rise
in prices resulted in an 80 percent drop in real wages between 1987
and 1990 in Lima (Saavedra, 1998). The negative labor income shock
would not necessarily have led to a decrease in consumption if house-
holds had had access to credit to smooth their expenditure. But
household survey data show that per capita consumption plummeted
almost 50 percent between 1985 and 1990 in Lima, suggesting that
poor households did not have access to credit to cope with the shock
(Glewwe and Hall, 1994).
Fallon and Lucas (2002) examined seven countries that su®ered
economic crises during the 1990s (Indonesia, 1998; Republic ofKorea,
1998; Malaysia, 1998; Thailand, 1997; Argentina, 1995; Mexico, 1995;
Turkey, 1994) and found that the main e®ect of the crisis on labor
demand was a drop in real wages, rather than a reduction in employ-
ment. Even though unemployment also increased, these countries did
not experience a signi¯cant decrease in employment, except in Korea.
However, the composition of employment did change. For example,
employment fell in construction but expanded in agriculture. There
is mixed evidence on employment in nontradable sectors. The au-
thors also ¯nd a switch from protected jobs (wage employment) to
unprotected jobs (selfemployment) during the crises in Indonesia and
Mexico.
Additional details related to the 1997-1998 Indonesian crisis sug-
gest the potentially harmful e®ects of price changes combined with
reduced labor demand. Indonesia su®ered an 80 percent hike in the
consumer price index and a 120 percent rate of in°ation in the price
ofrice in 1998. Real wages fell by 40 percent in the formal sector and
by 15-20 percent in the rural informal sector. The average household
consumption fell by 23 percent from 1997 to 1998, and real per capita
spending on non-foods declined by around 40 percent between 1997
and 1998 (Thomas, Beegle and Frankenberg, 2003, 2004). Very poor
urban dwellers were the most a®ected by the crisis because ofchanges
in the relative price of basic foodstu®s (Levinsohn, Berry and Fried-
man, 1999). The labor force participation rate was lower in 1999 than
in 1997 despite an increase in women's employment (Cameron, 2000).
In spite of the wide range of estimates of the impact of the crisis
on poverty in Indonesia, all studies point to an increase in the poverty¶ 42 ES TUDI OSECONOMI COS
rate after the crisis. Lanjouw et al . (2001) estimate that the poverty
rate increased by 11 percent from October 1997 to October 1998.
Skou¯as and Suryahadi (2000) ¯nd the poverty rate doubled from
12.4 percent in 1997 to 24.5 percent in 1998. Frankenberg, Thomas
and Beegle (1999) estimate that the proportion of households below
the poverty line rose by 25 percent from 1997 to 1999. They suggest
t h a tt h er i s ei np o v e r t yc o u l db ea r o u n d8 0p e r c e n ti ft h ee s t i m a t e
1 were adjusted for in°ation.
While the e®ects ofeconomic crises on the distribution ofincome
vary, there are cases in which not only poverty but also inequality in-
creases. A reason for increased inequality is that less skilled and
poorer workers are often more likely to be laid o® at the beginning
of an economic downturn. Lack of education and transferrable skills
implies that the group is likely to be the last to get employed after
the economy bounces back. Therefore, less skilled and poorer work-
ers tend to be unemployed for the longest duration during economic
crises (Jeanneney and Kpodar, 2008). Since labor income is the most
important (and, for many, the only) income source for poorer workers,
a prolonged crisis often leads to increases in inequality. Inequality in
Latin American countries clearly increased during the 1980s economic
crises (Fallon and Lucas, 2002).
Aggregate shocks can have long term impacts, not only transitory
e®ects on income. Based on a review of existing literature, Mendoza
(2009) concluded that when income shocks a®ect capabilities, they
lead not only to persistent poverty, but can actually result in the
intergenerational transmission of poverty. The e®ects of economic
shocks on capabilities linked to health, nutrition, and education - to
be reviewed next - may be particularly harmful.
3 . E co n o m ic C rise s, H e a lth a n d N u tritio n
There are several channels through which an economic shock, propa-
gated through the mechanisms outlined above, may negatively a®ect
1 O ne reason for the debate on the p overty im pact in Indonesia relates to the
use ofdi ®erent povert y l i nes. The G overnm ent ofI ndonesi a m ai ntai ns a set of
povert y l i nes (one urban and one rural ) f or each provi nce. I ndependentl y,the
W orl d B ank m ai ntai ns another set of poverty l i nes f or Indonesi a. R esearchers
m en tio n ed a b o v e a lso set th eir o w n p o v erty lin es. T h e rea so n is th a t in tim es o f
hi gh i n°ati on and l arge changesacrosssectorand regi on,i ti sdi ± cul tto generate
accurate p overty lines that re°ect w elfare changes at the household level.OVERVI EW :ECONOMI C CRI S ESAND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 43
health and nutrition outcomes in developing countries. The most di-
rect channel works through the impact of reduced real income, which
reduces the ability of households to pay for maintaining or improv-
ing health. When households are unable to bu®er consumption from
sharp income declines, private spending on food, medicine and health
care drops. For example, the deterioration in the nutritional status of
pregnant women and insu±cient prenatal care could lead to a higher
infant mortality rate (Baird, Friedman and Schady, 2007; Ferreira
and Schady, 2008; Paxon and Schady, 2005). The impact of the re-
treat in private spending can be aggravated by public spending cuts
that lower the provision of publicly available health services (Ferreira
and Schady 2008, Paxon and Schady 2005). In addition, strategies
followed by families to cope with lower real income may also aggra-
vate health outcomes (Cutler et al., 2002). For example, some people
may be forced to work longer hours or elder workers to delay retire-
ment, which could have a negative impact on health. Or a caregiver
(usually a female family member) may need to go back to the labor
force, harming the health of the young and the aged at home. There
is evidence suggesting that women enter the workforce in Mexico dur-
ing times of economic stress to diversify household earnings and to
protect against income losses (Parrado and Zenteno, 2001).
The increase in poverty during economic shocks may result in
a direct and irreversible loss of life. Banerjee and Du°o (2007) ¯nd
a strong positive association between poverty and mortality rates.
While they do not establish unequivocally a causal relationship from
poverty to higher death rates - it might be the case that less healthy
people become poor, and are therefore more likely to die - they assert
that their analysis is strongly suggestive that the causality runs from
p o v e r t yt od e a t h ,o ra st h e yp u ti t ,t h a tp o v e r t yk i l l s . D r a w i n go n
data from Indonesia, Vietnam, and India, they ¯nd that the extreme
poor (those living on less than PPP$1 ad a y )a n dt h ep o o r( t h o s e
living on less than PPP$2 a day) have higher mortality rates than
those living at higher levels of income (between PPP$6and PPP$10a
day in the case of Indonesia and Vietnam; more than PPP$2ad a yi n
India). These di®erentials hold across age groups and for both rural
and urban populations, even though the size ofthe di®erentials varies
- in particular, the size is larger for the older segments of the poor
population.
Table 2 reproduces some of the results for Vietnam and Indone-
sia. It compares the death rates (within 5 years) of the poor and
the non-poor for di®erent age groups. The death rate of poor chil-
dren under 5 years of age is higher than that of non-poor children¶ 44 ES TUDI OSECONOMI COS
in the same age group in both Vietnam and Indonesia. The small-
est gap in death rates between the poor and non-poor occurs for the
age group between 5 and 15 years old. In Vietnam, the elderly poor
have a death rate that is more than 3 percentage points, or about 30
percent, higher than the elderly non-poor. In the case of Indonesia,
the di®erentials are much larger across all age groups, but in relative
terms, poor children appear particularly vulnerable. If we interpret
the ratio of death rates of the poor and non-poor as the di®erence
in the likelihood of dying, poor children under 5 in Indonesia are al-
most four times more likely to die than non-poor children. If this
association holds more broadly and is persistent over time, then an
increase in poverty rates as a result of economic crisis will translate
into a higher number of deaths - than with the lower poverty rates
in the absence of the crisis - pushing both life expectancy down and
child mortality rates up.
Tabl e 2
D eath Rates by Age f or Poor and N on-Poor
(wi thi n ¯ve years f rom 1993)
Vi e t na m
D eath rates within 5 years Poor vs. N on poor
Less than $2 Be t we e n $6-$10 (1) -(2) (1)/(2)
(1) (2)
%% %
O l derthan 50 13.1 9.8 3.3 1.3
O l derthan 45 11.2 8.0 3.2 1.4
B etw een 15 and 45 1.0 0.0 1.0 {
B etw een 5 and 15 0.6 0.0 0.6 {
Les st han 5 1.2 0.0 1.2 {
Indonesi a
O l derthan 50 15.8 7.3 8.5 2.2
O l derthan 45 14.1 6.9 7.2 2.0
B etw een 15 and 45 3.7 1.0 2.7 3.7
B etw een 5 and 15 3.0 1.1 1.9 2.7
Les st han 5 3.8 1.0 2.8 3.8
Source:O wn el aborati on based on data f rom Banerj ee and D u°o (2007).OVERVI EW :ECONOMI C CRI S ESAND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 45
In a review ofstudies related to the e®ects ofeconomic shocks on
health, Ferreira and Schady (2008) conclude that economic crises tend
to have negative e®ects on health and nutrition outcomes for children
in poor countries but typically have positive e®ects for children in
rich countries (see table 3). The evidence for middle income countries
is mixed. For some middle-income countries like Mexico, Peru and
Russia, negative economic shocks a®ected child health and nutrition
negatively. But for others such as Colombia, the impact was positive.
The literature suggests that recessions in the United States ap-
pear to be good for health, while economic good times tend to be
less good for health (Edwards, 2009, is a recent re-statement of this
¯nding). This may be due to behavioral changes that have health im-
proving outcomes: less smoking and drinking, less tra±c accidents,
and more exercise (Ruhm, 2000, 2003, 2005, 2007). Dehejia and
Lleras-Muney (2004) also ¯nd that infant mortality improves in the
United States during recessions, which can be explained in part by
an increase in the time that mothers spent engaging in exercise and
prenatal care (there is also a possible selection e®ect in terms of the
socioeconomic characteristics ofthose who chose to become mothers).
There is also evidence, however, that di±cult economic conditions
may have long-term adverse health e®ects even in developed coun-
tries (van den Berg, Lindeboom and Portrait, 2006 and Case, Fertig
and Paxson, 2005), and that even industrial countries may exhibit
deteriorating health outcomes when faced with large negative shocks
(see the discussion on the transition economies below).
Tabl e 3
E ®ect of a N egative A ggregate E conom ic Shock
o n C h ild H ea lth a n d N u tritio n O u tco m es
R ich cou n tries P o sitive im pa ct
- United States
M i ddl e-i ncom e countri es A m bi guous i m pact
Exam pl e ofa posi ti ve i m pact
-C o l u m b i a
Exam pl es ofa negative im pact
-P e r u
-M e x i c o
-R u s s i a¶ 46 ES TUDI OSECONOMI COS
Tabl e 3
(continued)
Poor countri es N egati ve i m pact
- Nicaragua
-I n d i a
-C o t ed ' I v o i r e
-Z i m b a b w e
-E t h i o p i a
-T a n z a n i a
-C a m e r o o n
Ferreira and Schady (2008) interpret these results with a theory
that describes both the income and the substitution e®ects on health
outcomes associated with a negative economic shock, and how the
level of income may determine the net health impact of an economic
shock. Economic shocks reduce the consumption of health services,
w h i c hc o r r e s p o n d st oan e g a t i v ei n c o m ee ® e c t ,b u tt h e r em a yb ep o s -
itive income e®ects, as well, ifthere is a reduction in the consumption
of goods that are harmful to people's health such as cigarettes and
alcohol. In poor countries, or for families with low income, the nega-
tive income e®ect is likely to overwhelm any potential positive income
e®ect. The marginal e®ect on health of a dollar lost for the poor may
a®ect spending on essential goods like more nutritious food or basic
health services, while the loss for the rich will not a®ect this baseline
spending, only perhaps less essential and potentially health harmful
goods. Substitution e®ects may also explain how in rich countries
economic recessions improve health, with more time dedicated to ac-
tivities that improve people's health such as exercise, or more adult
time dedicated to child-health improving activities.
Baird, Friedman and Schady (2007) investigate the relationship
between short-term °uctuations in aggregate income and infant mor-
tality using a large dataset of 59 developing countries, which covers
over 1.7 million births. The authors ¯nd that there is a large negative
relationship between per capita GDPand infant mortality -on average,
a decrease of one point in log per capita GDP is associated with an
increase in mortality of between 18 and 44 infants per 1 000 births.
They also ¯nd that the impact of economic °uctuations on infant
mortality is highly asymmetric depending on whether the economic
°uctuation is a contraction or an expansion. The negative impactOVERVI EW :ECONOMI C CRI S ESAND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 47
of contractions on infant mortality rates tends to be bigger than the
positive impact of expansions.
The e®ect of economic crises on health is also asymmetric in
terms of gender e®ects. When an economic crisis hits, mothers forego
meals more often than fathers, and in many countries boys get prefer-
ence over girls in terms of eating regular meals and receiving medical
treatment (Baird, Friedman and Schady, 2007). As illustrated in
¯gure 1, Baird, Friedman and Schady (2007) show that the impact
of economic °uctuations on infant mortality is asymmetric between
male infants and female infants. The di®erence between the negative
impact of economic contractions and the positive impact of economic
expansions on infant mortality is much greater for girls than it is
f o rb o y s . W h i l eb o y sa n dg i r l sb e n e ¯ te q u a l l yf r o mp o s i t i v ei n c o m e
shocks, girls su®er much more than boys from negative income shocks.
Quantitatively, negative shocks to GDP per capita ofabout 6 percent
on average increase average infant mortality by 7.4 deaths for 1 000
births for girls and 1.5 deaths for 1 000 births for boys (Baird, Fried-
man and Schady, 2007: 25-26). Schultz (1997) points out that an
increase in child mortality will probably place additional burdens on
women because of their roles as child bearers and care givers. For
example, mothers will be disproportionately exposed to pregnancy-
related health risks ifparents choose to have additional births to cope
with the increase in child mortality rates. Bhalotra (2009) also ¯nds
that rural infant mortality in India is countercyclical, the elasticity
being about -0.33 during 1970-1997. Disaggregation reveals that it is
only girls that are at risk; boys are protected from income shocks.
Cutler etal . (2002) ¯nd that during the Mexican 1995-1996 eco-
nomic crisis, the mortality rate increased by 5 to 7 percent compared
to the years prior to the crisis. This translates into about 20 000 ad-
ditional deaths among the elderly and 7 000 additional deaths among
children. For children aged 0 to 4, the mortality rate was approxi-
mately 7 percent above the expected level (the child mortality rate
increased by 9.2 percent during 1982-1984 and by 10.3 percent dur-
ing 1985-1989). World Bank (2001) reports that during the Mexican
economic crisis, among children under age 1, the mortality rate from
anemia increased from 6.3 deaths per 100 000 births in 1993 to 7.9 in
1995. Among children ages 1-4, the mortality rate from anemia rose
from 1.7 per 100,000 births to 2.2 during the crisis period.
Cutler et al . (2002) attribute the increase in Mexican mortality
rates during the 1995-1996 economic crisis to reduced income and cuts
in public spending on health care. They ¯nd that as the economic
crisis hit Mexico, the unemployment rate among adult males went¶ 48 ES TUDI OSECONOMI COS
up from 3.6 percent in 1994 to 6.1 percent in 1995. Out-of-pocket
health expenditures declined during the crisis from 3.9 percent of
GDP in 1994 to 3.1 percent of GDP in 1995, and the declines are
most signi¯cant for families with elderly members. Public health
spending in Mexico rose steadily from a low 2.7 percent in 1987 to
3.8 percent of GDP in 1994. But between 1994 and 1996, public
health spending dropped to 3.4 percent of GDP,a n dp e rc a p i t ap u b l i c
health spending fell by 15 percent. At the same time, there were
important changes in per capita spending on the uninsured population
through the PASSPA (Program a de A poyo a l osServi ci osde Sal ud para
2 Pob l ac i ¶ on A bi erta) program. Between 1994 and 1995, when public
health spending declined in all regions, the sharpest fall was in the
PASSPA states, 25 percent.
Fi gur e1
R elationship betw een Infant M ortality
Rat eandDe t r e nde d GDP
N ote: E stim ated w ith locally w eighted least squares. GDP is m ea su red
i n year 2000 i nternati onal(PPP).Source: B ai rd,Fri edm an and Schady (2007).
2 ThePASSPA program w as sp onsored by W orld B ank to o® er basic health
services to the uninsured and rural p opulations in the p oorest states of M exico.
T he program is im plem ented by the M exican Secretariat of H ealth.OVERVI EW :ECONOMI C CRI S ESAND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 49
Paxson and Schady (2005) ¯nd that during the Peruvian 1988-
1990 economic crisis there was a sharp increase in the infant mortal-
ity rate from 50 per 1 000 births in 1988 to 75 around 1990 which
corresponds to more than 17 000 \excess" infant mortality incidents
among children born in 1990. This infant mortality increase began in
t h es e c o n dh a l fo f1 9 8 9a n dp e a k e df o rc h i l d r e nb o r ni nt h e¯ r s th a l f
of 1990. Children born during this period were more likely to die in
the ¯rst month of life and also more likely to die in the ¯rst 6 and 12
months of life. For example, among children born in the ¯rst half of
1990 who survived at least 1 month, 20 per 1 000 died between ages 1
and 6 months compared to 8 per 1 000 for those born in the ¯rst half
of 1988. Similarly, the mortality rate of those surviving to 6 months
but died before 12 months also went up from 14 per 1 000 to 25 per
1 000 from 1988 to 1990.
Paxson and Schady (2005) suggest that a collapse in public health
spending probably contributed to the large increase in infant mortal-
ity in Peru. Between 1985 and 1990, public health expenditure in
Peru dropped by 58 percent, declining from 4.3 percent to 3 per-
cent of the Peruvian government's budget. The number of prenatal
visits fell steadily from 1987 through 1991 and recovered only after-
wards. Based on the authors' estimates, women who gave birth in
1991 (many of whom would have been pregnant in 1990) had 0.28
fewer prenatal visits than those in 1987; women who gave birth in
1992 (many of whom would have been pregnant in 1991) had 0.38
fewer visits than those in 1996. This shows that there were signi¯-
cant declines in health care utilization during the crisis years. These
declines occurred either because of reductions in public health spend-
ing or drops in household incomes. The authors ¯nd that households
in Peru were able to sustain their consumption of food items but had
to cut their non-food item spending such as medications and health
care after the crisis hit.
In Indonesia, the impact of the 1997-1998 ¯nancial crisis on
health and nutrition outcomes is not consensual. Some suggest that
there was an increase in infant mortality rates. Rukumnuaykit (2003)
¯nds that infant mortality spiked up from about 30 per 1 000 births
in 1996 to 48 in 1998. Simms and Rowson (2003) ¯nd that the infant
mortality rate increased in 22 of Indonesia's 26 provinces between
1996 and 1999. But there is no evidence showing that child nutri-
tion levels or health status signi¯cantly worsened during the crisis
(Frankenberg, Thomas and Beegle, 1999).
There is some evidence of poorer nutrition among Indonesian
adults, especially among the poorest. Frankenberg, Thomas and Bee-¶ 50 ES TUDI OSECONOMI COS
gle (1999) report that the Body Mass Index (BM I )o fa d u l t sa g e d1 8
and older declined signi¯cantly during the crisis years, for both males
and females and at all ages but the decline was most pronounced
among older adults. There was a signi¯cant increase in the proportion
ofadults with a BM Ibelow18 (thecut-o®belowwhichrespondentsare
considered to be unhealthy and both morbidity and mortality rates
tend to increase). In 1997, 13.6 percent of panel respondents were in
this category. By 1998, 15.4 percent of respondents have fallen below
the cut-o®. The decline in BM Iis likely caused by two factors, in-
creased energy output (possibly due to working harder) and reduced
energy intake (possibly due to eating less).
The proportion of household income spent on health decreased
signi¯cantly in Indonesia while health costs rose by at least as much
as consumer price in°ation. There was a sharp decline in the use
of public healthcare. The percentage of children under ¯ve visiting
community primary health care centers (posyandu) fell from 46.7 per-
cent to 27.7 percent, accompanied by a fall in the number of children
receiving vitamin A supplements. Waiting time in health care centers
increased and drugs became less available (Frankenberg, Thomas and
Beegle, 1999).
Still, in contrast with the experience of other countries that suf-
fered economic crises, Indonesia did not experience as sharp a decline
in child health and nutrition outcomes during the economic crisis.
The possible explanation is that Indonesia was able to protect its
expenditures on public health from dropping signi¯cantly with the
help of donor assistance. In comparison, public health expenditures
in Peru, as discussed earlier, fell by more than 58 percent during its
crisis, and there is no evidence showing that other sources such as
foreign assistance compensated for such a decrease.
According to Lieberman, Juwono and Marzoeki (2001), Indonesia
relied heavily on foreign donors to make up its domestic shortfalls in
public health spending during the crisis years. The donor share of
Indonesian public health spending accounted for less than 10 percent
in the mid 1990s but rose to 24 percent during 1998-2000. Donor-
assisted health spending per capita increased four times in real terms
between 1995 and 2000. During the crisis period, foreign donors'
assistance on health spending increased by 278 percent in real terms
(from 207.5 billion rupiah during 1997-1998 to 577.9 billion rupiah
during 1998-1999) while real Indonesian domestic ¯nancial sources
spent on public health dropped by 21 percent (from 2 533.7 billion
rupiah during 1997-1998 to 2 014.4 billion rupiah during 1998-1999).
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in household health expenditure as previously indicated) was largely
compensated by the sharp increase in donor assistance to the health
sector. The net result was a 5 percent decline in overall govern-
ment health expenditure during 1998-1999. In the next ¯scal year
(1999-2000), donor-assisted health spending continued to increase by
another 17 percent. It is reported that most of foreign assistance to
the health sector went to government hospitals. Thus, during the
crisis period, real spending per capita on public hospitals actually
went up by 13 percent, while real spending per capita on primary
care dropped by more than 10 percent.
Revisiting a relatively recent and familiar episode, the aftermath
of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the transition process under-
taken by many countries in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, also
helps to reveal that collapses in economic growth often go along with
a deterioration of living standards, increased mortality rates, and the
consequent reduction in life expectancy (Sachs, 1996).
Figure 2 shows the paths ofincome per capita and life expectancy
at birth (for males) for nine transition economies. The general pattern
is clear: the growth collapse that started in 1989-1999 was accompa-
nied by sharp drops in life expectancy for all six countries except for
Poland.
It is striking to observe that when economic growth resumed in
the mid 1990s, the decreasing trend in life expectancy reversed, in
some countries quite abruptly, but it is also important to note that
(of the countries considered and excluding Poland) only the Kyr-
gyz Republic and Latvia recovered to the levels of life expectancy of
1989. This is suggestive of the asymmetric pattern that, as will be
elaborated below, appears to characterize the relationship between
economic °uctuations and changes in human development indicators:
income contractions have a stronger negative e®ect than the positive
e®ect (if any, see Russia since 1998) of income expansions.
The case of the Russian Federation is particularly informative.
From 1989 to 1994 life expectancy at birth for males dropped by more
than seven years, from 64 to 57 years - a rate of yearly collapse of
more than one year of life expectancy. Then it rebounded strongly,
increasing by four years to 61 in 1998. Latvia exhibits the same
pattern, but while the increase in life expectancy persisted onwards
in this country, there was another collapse in life expectancy in the
Russian Federation after 1998, from which the country has yet to
recover.
The 1998 collapse in life expectancy in the Russian Federation
coincided with another economic crisis. As the income line shows,¶ 52 ES TUDI OSECONOMI COS
growth was picking up in 1997, but unlike the other countries in
which economic growth persisted, in Russia income collapsed again
during the 1998 ¯nancial and economic crisis that a®ected the coun-
try. Epidemiological studies suggest that the causes and the nature
of the increase in mortality rates during 1989-1994 and during 1998-
2001 are similar, and they correlate strongly with social and economic
factors (Men, et al ., 2003).
The increase in mortality rates that went along with the two
growth collapses in Russia cannot be attributed exclusively to the
concomitant impoverishment of parts of the population. The largest
contribution to increased mortality rates comes from middle-aged
adults (35-69 years). Mortality increases relate to violent deaths (sui-
cide, tra±c accidents, homicides), and alcohol poisoning. All of these
causes ofdeath, with the possible exception ofcardio vascular disease,
are related to increases in alcohol consumption (Mesle, 2002). Evi-
dence does suggest that increased alcohol consumption was triggered
in part by socioeconomic stress in di±cult economic conditions, and
also that stress had an independent e®ect on the increase in mortality
rates (Walberg et al ., 1998).
Fi gur e2
L ife E xpecta n cy an d In co m e in T ra n sitio n C ou n tries
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Source: O w n elab oration based on data from W orld B ank (2008b). N ote:
Solid line represents life expectancy at birth for m ales in years (left hand scale);
dashed line represents the logarithm of GDP percapi ta i n constantl ocalcurrency
units (right hand scale). C ountries are ordered by increasing incom e per capita
i n 1990 (i n constant 2000 USdollars) from left to right, top to b ottom .
4 . E co n o m ic C rise s a n d E d u ca tio n
The transmission channels from economic shocks to education out-
comes are similar to those that relate to health outcomes, with the
combined e®ects of reduced private and public spending on educa-
tion, adding to the e®ects of coping strategies such as taking children
out ofschool and putting them to work, may result in reduced school
enrollment and completion rates. But as with health, the impact of
economic shocks depends on the level of income, the depth of pub-
lic education cuts, and the ability of households to smooth income
shocks.
In a review of the e®ects of economic shocks on education, Fer-
reira and Schady (2008) show that school enrollment rates tends to
decline in low-income countries but increase in high-income countries,¶ 56 ES TUDI OSECONOMI COS
while the impact of economic crisis on school enrollment or attain-
ment rates in middle-income countries is ambiguous (see table 4).
However, the empirical evidence is, on the whole, much less robust
than it is for health outcomes.
Tabl e 4
E ®ect of a N egative A ggregate E conom ic Shock
on C hi l d Educati on O utcom es
R ich co u n tries P o sitive im pa ct
- United States
M i ddl e-i ncom e countri es A m bi guous i m pact
Exam pl es ofa posi ti ve i m pact
-M e x i c o
-B r a z i l
-P e r u
- Nicaragua
E xam ple of a negative im pact
-C o s t aR i c a
Poor countri es N egati ve i m pact
-I n d o n e s i a
-C o t ed ' I v o i r e
-M a l a w i
-( N i c a r a g u a )
N ote: P arentheses indicate the reverse e® ect, for countries that deviate from the
theoretical predictions. Source: Ferreira and Schady (2008): 50.
Ferreira and Schady (2008) interpret these empirical ¯ndings us-
ing a framework that, as in the case ofhealth, suggests that the e®ects
of economic shocks on education depend on income and substitution
e®ects. Declining wages or lack of employment opportunities may
make child labor relatively less attractive, which may increase par-
ents' incentive to send their children to school. On the other hand,
lower parental income increases the marginal value of additional in-
come that children can bring home if they work. The net outcome
of these e®ects will vary across economic agents, depending on the
household's preference and surrounding factors (Ravallion, 2008). For
instance, a negative economic shock may induce changes in behavior
that may lead to improvements in education in rich countries, becauseOVERVI EW :ECONOMI C CRI S ESAND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 57
households in rich countries have more access to credit to absorb the
income shock (small income e®ect), but the decreased child wage may
lead to incentive to keep children at school (large substation e®ect),
as happened in United States during the Great Depression (Goldin,
2001).
The negative aggregate income shock is likely to have a negative
impact on education in poor countries and for poor households for
several reasons (Ferreira and Schady, 2008). First, if the initial level
of income is low, the marginal utility from consumption is high. Poor
households will have more incentive to send children to earn addi-
tional income to compensate the loss of income incurred by the ag-
gregate shock. Second, when households do not have access to credit
to smooth consumption during the economic downturn, the income
e®ect is likely to dominate the substitution e®ect. Third, if the crisis
is severe and long, poor households tend to deplete their resources
to smooth their expenditure. These factors would lead one to expect
pro-cyclical schooling outcomes (less education during recession).
Empirical evidence is consistent with the theoretical predication
for the pro-cyclical schooling in low-income countries and for the poor-
est populations. Frankenberg, Thomas and Beegle (1999) ¯nd signif-
icant declines in enrollment of young children among the poorest of
Indonesians after the 1997 ¯nancial crisis. The percentage of 7-12
year olds who were not enrolled doubled from 6 percent in 1997 to
12 percent in 1998. The percentage of 13-19 year olds who were not
enrolled increased as well, especially in urban areas from 33 percent
in 1997 to 38 percent in 1998. By 1998, children from the poorest
households were about ¯ve times more likely to be out of school than
their counterparts at the top of the expenditure distribution.
Children from poorer households are also more likely to drop out
of school during the crisis years. World Bank (2001) reports that
the drop-out rate for Indonesian children in the poorest fourth of the
population rose from 1.3 percent in 1997 to 7.5 percent in 1998 for
those ages 7-12 and from 14.2 percent to 25.5 percent for those ages
13-19. The share of children in the poorest fourth of the population
not enrolled in school rose from 4.9 percent in 1997 to 10.7 percent
in 1998 for those ages 7-12 and from 42.5 percent to 58.4 percent for
those ages 13-19.
The worsening education outcomes for the poorest Indonesians
during the 1997-1998 economic crisis could be attributed to fewer ¯-
nancial resources made available for education. Indonesians reduced
their expenditure on non-food items to cope with the ¯nancial crisis.
Thomas, Beegle and Frankenberg (2004) ¯nd that both real educa-¶ 58 ES TUDI OSECONOMI COS
tion expenditures and the share of the household budget spent on
schooling declined between 1997 and 1998 in Indonesia. Education
expenditure per age-eligible child (5-20 years old) declined by 2 700
rupiah in the urban areas and by 1 500 rupiah in the rural areas. Av-
erage education spending on an enrolled child fell by over 3 000 rupiah
in urban areas and over 2000 rupiah in rural areas. The share of the
household budget allocated to education dropped by over 10 percent
in urban areas and nearly 30 percent in rural areas. The authors ¯nd
that the reduction in education spending is concentrated among the
poorest populations.When faced with a negative income shock, poor
households in both urban and rural areas tend to invest less in school-
ing, especially for their younger children (10-14-year-olds), although
poor households with older children (15-19 years old) tend to protect
education spending..
There is evidence that the impact of economic crises on educa-
tional outcomes is gender-speci¯c as well. In low-income countries
both girls and boys may drop out of school during an economic cri-
sis. But according to World Bank (2009), in poor countries with
pre-existing low female schooling, girls are especially vulnerable to
being pulled out of school. Gubert and Robilliard (2007) ¯nd that in
Madagascar, where school enrolment rates for girls are low, girls are
more likely to drop out of school than boys when families are hit by a
negative household income shock. Duryea, Lam and Levison (2007)
¯nd that in Brazil girls are more likely to be pulled out ofschool when
there is a negative income shock. They estimate the probability of a
16-year-old girl dropping out of school and entering the employment
is as much as 50 percent higher compared to when there is no negative
income shock. In middle-income countries, the e®ect is ambiguous.
In Costa Rica, school enrollment rates dropped approximately 6 per-
cent between 1981 and 1982 during the economic crisis, with larger
drops in rural areas. The drop in schooling was associated with an
increase in the fraction of children working during the same period.
However, children who were exposed to the Peruvian economic cri-
sis of the late 1980s had completed more years of schooling for their
age than comparable children who were not exposed (Ferreira and
Schady 2008). In Mexico, gross primary enrollment increased by 0.44
percent in 1994, but fell by 0.09 percent in 1995 according to World
Bank (2001).
5 .Co nc l us i o n
The main ¯ndings are summarized in ¯gure 3. Negative growth
shocks a®ect rich and poor countries di®erently. In rich countries,OVERVI EW :ECONOMI C CRI S ESAND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 59
negative economic shocks are associated with improvements in health
and educational outcomes while in poor countries they lead to set-
backs (the impact is ambiguous for middle-income countries). Human
development indicators either deteriorate or improve at a slower pace
during an economic crisis in poor developing countries. Concei» c~ ao
and Kim (2009) ¯nd similar results from the data for 200 countries
between 1983 and 2006.
Fi gur e3
Im pacton H eal th and Educati on O utcom es i n Poor
and R ich C ountries D epending on G row th P erform ance
N ote: Illustrative.
Ifthe pattern found in our empirical analysis persists, given that
all countries are likely to face recessions at the same time during
this global economic downturn, not only will developing countries
face setbacks in human development outcomes, but the long-running
trend of convergence in many human development indicators across
countries may slow down or even reverse.
T h e r ei sn os i m p l ew a yt od e s c r i b et h eh u m a nd e v e l o p m e n ti m -
pacts of the current economic crisis. However, the literature on past
economic crises and our empirical ¯ndings suggest that the current
economic crisis poses grave risks to human development outcomes,
but that it might also open a unique window of opportunity to intro-
duce welfare improving policies. If policy measures to mitigate the¶ 60 ES TUDI OSECONOMI COS
shock are well targeted towards the poor, they are likely to minimize
the negative impact on human development outcomes, and contribute
to both the recovery and longer term growth.
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